编者按：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波于6月6日在《南华早报》发表题为“皮特·赫格塞思在对华立场上的突然转变，是否反映了一个正在衰落的美国？”（Does Pete Hegseth's volte face on China reflect an America in decline）的评论文章。

他指出，美国国防部部长赫格塞思之所以在香格里拉对话会上对华态度较去年大幅软化，是因为特朗普访华取得了成功。随着中美实力此消彼长，美国在对台军售等问题上会倍感艰难。双方如重启军事对话，应在原有的基础上增加新的内容，如规范人工智能军事应用等。尽管中美达成“建设性战略稳定关系”共识，但稳定从来不是静态的。真正的挑战在于如何在激烈竞争中维护这种稳定。

图截自《南华早报》网站

【翻译/北京对话 李琛峣】

在新加坡刚刚落幕的香格里拉对话会上，聆听美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞思的发言时，我想起了川剧中的经典绝活——变脸。演员在电光石火间切换面具，令人叹为观止。

去年，赫格塞思在同一场合的演讲充满了对中国的公然抨击。而今年，他换上了一副截然不同的面孔，宣称：“在特朗普总统的领导下，美中关系正处于多年来最好的时期。”

为何会出现如此180度的大转弯？答案就藏在特朗普近期对北京的访问——他本人盛赞此访为“巨大成功”。如果说，对特朗普而言，绝对的忠诚是作为其下属的首要要求，那么作为其核心圈内人之一的赫格塞思，此番表现可谓完美诠释了这一信条。

赫格塞思的讲话没有提及台湾。这同样不令人意外。特朗普在北京似乎也淡化了对台湾问题的表述。回程途中，他坦言尚未决定对台军售，还说：“我们要跋涉9500英里（约15300公里）去打一场仗——我可不想这样。”

特朗普在返回美国的专机上表示不支持“台独”，更不会为台湾开战

随着中美实力差距不断缩小，美国未来在对台军售问题上只会愈发艰难。今天的北京已经拥有远比过去丰富得多的反制工具：取消对美大型采购协议、制裁美国军工企业，在台海周边展开更高频率、更高强度、更复杂的军事演训。

北京甚至完全可以多线并举、同步施压，令美方承受最大代价。届时，华盛顿不得不权衡一个现实的问题：这些军售固然利润丰厚，但是否值得为此承担被卷入一场无法取胜冲突的风险？

赫格塞思在演讲中提到，美中两军之间正在恢复更频繁的接触。如果这一消息属实，倒真是好事。长期以来，两军正式沟通机制匮乏，许多既有渠道——包括解放军联合参谋部和美国参谋长联席会议之间的交流以及多项军事对话机制——都已搁置。即便这些机制全面恢复，又该如何旧瓶装新酒？

2024年利马会晤期间，习近平主席与时任美国总统拜登达成共识：核指挥与控制必须置于人的监管之下。尽管特朗普急于否定拜登的任何政治遗产，但他没有理由反对这一共识。俄乌战场上的无人机作战表明，人工智能正以惊人速度改变战争形态。作为人工智能领域的两大领跑者，中美理应率先制定具有约束力的规则，规范这一技术在军事领域的应用。

赫格塞思的表态仍然萦绕着意识形态的“旧幽灵”。他暗指中国是霸权国家，对中国军力建设表示担忧。然而，当特朗普治下的美国一边威胁盟友伙伴、一边发动战争时，这套说辞便很难让人信服。难怪在一些民调中，中国的全球支持率已经超过了美国。《外交事务》杂志的一篇分析指出，中国正在“以等待制胜”。

亚太地区没有哪个美国的盟友或伙伴会响应赫格塞思的号召，把国防预算提高到GDP的3.5%。日本倾注大量资源提升军费，也不过达到GDP的2%左右；韩国在地区盟友中比例最高，也仅为2.8%。

联盟体系像个黑帮：老大发号施令，小弟唯命是从。但前提是老大承担大部分责任，支付大部分成本。赫格塞思警告“搭便车”、主张盟友分摊国防负担，恰恰违背了这种心照不宣的潜规则。

赫格塞思一而再再而三地提到要“强大、安静、清晰”。但他此番用意尚不明朗。 “强大”或许是三者中最容易理解的一个。不知他那句“少开一点香格里拉会，多造一点军舰、潜艇”的生硬建议，会让这个年度防务论坛的主办方作何感想。

图源：央视新闻

赫格塞思还誓言要“清晰表明我们的意图、优先事项以及实现政府目标的能力”。他主张将军事实力与“清晰的意图”相结合，承诺“有意识地选择沟通的方式与时机”，并“首先以行动来领导”。

美国对伊朗的战争是否体现了“清晰的意图”？没人确切知道特朗普为何对伊朗发动军事打击，更不必说那些他可能被以色列总理内塔尼亚胡怂恿出手的猜测了。

三个词中最耐人寻味的是“安静”。我的直觉是：这个世界的唯一超级大国，怎么可能突然就决定变得“安静”了？美国国家战略的首要目标现在是西半球。所谓的“唐罗主义”（特朗普版“门罗主义”）暗示着要从世界其他地区战略收缩——然而，我们看到的恰恰相反。

关于美国是否在衰落，已有不少讨论。如果说它正变得更加鲁莽和不可预测——事实似乎正是如此——那么，没错，昔日的美利坚确实在江河日下。问题在于，美国还会变得多危险？古巴会是下一个目标吗？

特朗普北京之行最重要的成果是达成了关于“建设性战略稳定关系”的共识。由此观之，赫格塞思讲话中对中国释放的善意比某些前任部长更多也不足为怪。但稳定从来不是静态的。真正的挑战在于，如何在激烈竞争中维系这种稳定。

原文：

Listening to US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth at the recently concluded Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, I thought of the iconic Sichuan opera act of face-changing, where performers switch masks in an instant.

Last year, Hegseth’s speech at the event was filled with blatant attacks on China. This year, he put on a completely different face, declaring that: “Under President Trump’s leadership, relations between the United States and China are better than they’ve been in many years.”

Why this 180-degree turn? The answer lies in Donald Trump’s recent visit to Beijing, hailed by him as a “tremendous success”. If unwavering loyalty is the foremost requirement from Trump, then Hegseth’s performance, as one of his top lieutenants, perfectly embodied this ethos.

Hegseth’s speech did not mention Taiwan. Again, this was no surprise. Trump, it seemed, had little to say on the Taiwan issue in Beijing. On his way back, he said he had not yet decided on US arms sales to Taiwan, that “we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles (about 15,300km) to fight a war. I’m not looking for that”.

Washington will find it increasingly hard to sell arms to Taiwan. As the China-US power gap narrows, Beijing now has a spectrum of retaliatory tools: cancelling pre-agreed bulk purchases from US firms, imposing sanctions on American defence contractors, or staging larger, more frequent and complex military exercises around the island.

Beijing can even deploy all three tactics simultaneously in a coordinated counterstrike to maximise pain on the US. Washington will ultimately be forced to assess if these arms sales, while lucrative, draw the US into an unwinnable military conflict.

In his speech, Hegseth noted that the US military was meeting more frequently with its Chinese counterparts. This is good news if true. Formal military dialogue mechanisms have been scarce. A host of once-established channels – including talks between both countries’ joint chiefs of staff and dialogues between the two armies – had been suspended. If fully restored, how could these old bottles be filled with new wine?

At the 2024 Lima meeting, President Xi Jinping and then US president Joe Biden agreed that nuclear command and control must remain under human oversight. While Trump is keen to dismiss any Biden legacy, he has no grounds for opposing this accord. The drone attacks of Russia and Ukraine show how artificial intelligence is advancing at breakneck speed on the battlefield. As the dominant AI powers, China and the US ought to take the lead in establishing binding norms governing the military application of this technology.

Old ideological ghosts haunted Hegseth’s remarks. His implicit narratives framing China as a hegemonic power and raising concerns over China’s military build-up are clearly visible. But this argument carries little persuasive weight when Trump’s America has threatened allies and partners, and launched wars. It is no surprise China’s global approval ratings have climbed to surpass America’s in some polls. According to an analysis in Foreign Affairs magazine, China is “winning by waiting”.

No American ally and partner in the region will answer Hegseth’s call to raise their defence budgets to 3.5 percents of their gross domestic product. Japan has poured extensive resources into boosting its military budget yet only managed to reach an estimated 2 percents of its GDP, while South Korea, boasting the highest figure among regional allies, is at just 2.8 percents.

An alliance system can resemble a criminal gang, with the boss calling the shots and underlings obeying unquestioningly, yet this arrangement hinges on the boss bearing the bulk of the responsibility and paying most of the costs. Hegseth’s warning against a “free ride” and his talk of increasing the defence “burden sharing” violate this unspoken rule.

Several times, Hegseth spoke of the importance of being “strong, quiet, clear”. It’s not clear what he means – though “strong” may be the most straightforward concept of the three to understand. One wonders, however, how his strongly worded suggestion of “less Shangri-La, more ships, more subs” went down with the organisers of the annual defence forum.

Hegseth also vowed to be “clear about our intentions, our priorities and our ability to deliver on the administration’s goals”. He spoke of pairing military with “clarity of intent”, promising to be “intentional about how and when we communicate” and to “lead first and foremost with actions”.

Does America’s war on Iran show “clarity of intent”? No one knows exactly why Trump launched a military strike against Iran, never mind the speculation he was goaded into operations by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The most nebulous of the three terms is “quiet”. My hunch is this: how can the world’s sole supranational power suddenly decide to become quiet? The first priority in America’s national strategy now is the western hemisphere. The so-called Donroe doctrine suggests a strategic retreat from the rest of the world; however, we are seeing exactly the opposite.

Much has been said about whether America is in decline. If, as appears, it is becoming more reckless and unpredictable, then, yes, it is in decline. The question then is how much more dangerous America can become. Is Cuba the next target?

The most important outcome of Trump’s Beijing visit is a consensus on “constructive strategic stability”. In this regard, it is not strange that Hegseth’s address contained more gestures of goodwill towards China than some of his predecessors, but stability is never static. The challenge is how it can be maintained amid the fierce competition.